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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-4-
I03(2)(b) and U) (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
I. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN RULING THAT THE FACTS AS
ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF COULD NOT SUPPORT A CLAIM THAT
DEFENDANT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S ANNEXATION PETITION
WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL?
II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN RULING THAT THE FACTS AS
ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF COULD NOT SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR
INVERSE CONDEMNATION?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court order granting a motion to dismiss is reviewed on appeal for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's determination. Code v. Utah Dep't of
Health, 2007 UT App 390, ~ 3, 174 P.3d 1134. A trial court considering a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)( 6) is required to accept the facts as pleaded as true. Russell v.
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, the facts asserted herein
are deemed admitted for the purposes of this appeal.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES / ORDINANCES
Utah Code Annotated §10-9a-801(3). See Addendum I.
STATEMENT OF CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
I. Nature of the Case
Plaintiff / Appellant Ralph Merrill, d/b/a Quinn's Junction Partnership ("QJP")
filed this action to challenge the decision by Defendant / Appellee Park City ("Park
665 :391935v4
City") to deny QJP's annexation petition. QJP alleged that although the property at issue
in this dispute (the "QJP Property") lies in Summit County, outside the boundaries of
Park City, that Park City has for at least the past fifteen (15) years exercised land use
control over the QJP Property by virtue of certain agreements between Summit County
and Park City. As set forth in greater detail below, Park City denied QJP's annexation
petition as part of an ongoing course of conduct, which has included several moratoria on
development and impossible development requirements, designed to preclude all
development on the property, and either maintain the property in its current undeveloped
state or obtain the property for open space at an artificially depressed price. In addition,
by exercising its annexation power to maintain the QJP Property as open space by
preventing any economically viable use for the QJP Property, Park City inversely
II. Course of Proceedings and Order Dismissing Complaint
District Judge Lubeck dismissed QJP's Revised Second Amended Complaint on
April 22, 2008, ruling that the facts as alleged by QJP could not establish that Park City's
denial of QJP's annexation petition was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, and that QJP had
failed to state a valid claim for inverse condemnation. See Order of April 22, 2008,
Addendum 2. QJP appeals from that Order of dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts must be accepted as true and considered in the light most
favorable to QJP.
665 :391935v4
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Parties
1. Plaintiff, Ralph Merrill, d/b/a Quinn's lunction Partnership, ("Q1P") has for
the past eighteen (18) years been the owner of approximately thirty (30) acres of real
property in the Snyderville Basin, Summit County, Utah (the "Q1P" property). (R. 140, ~
1).
2. Defendant Park City ("Park City") IS a body politic and a political
subdivision of the State of Utah. (R. 140, ~ 3).
The QJP Property
3. The Q1P Property lies northeast of Park City and is contiguous to Park
City's boundary on the north and contiguous to a parcel of property owned by Barnes
Bank- which has been annexed into Park City. The 01P Prooertv is ohvsicallv located on
.J '" •••••. ..1,;..1 '" ••••
commonly referred to as Quinn's Junction. (R. 141, ~ 6; see also Exhibit 2).
General Allegations
4. QJP purchased the QJP Property in 1990 at commercial prices because at
that time the QJP Property was the only property in Quinn's Junction designated as a
hard commercial zone. (R. 141-142, ~~ 8, 11-12).
5. Extensive infrastructure for commercial development was placed at or near
QJP Property, including the only sewer line along the southwest corridor of SR 248,
within 400 feet of Quinn's intersection. (R. 141, ~ 9).
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6. Q1P relied on the commercial zone, as well as representations by City and
County officials, in purchasing the property at commercial prices in about 1990. (R.
141, ~ 11).
7. QJP was assessed and paid a property tax based on the commercial zone
for the QJP Property. (R. 142, ~ 12).
8. On January 14, 1993, Summit County down-zoned the QJP Property from
a commercial zone to a zone that allowed only 1 unit per 40 acres to be built no sooner
than ten (10) years and as many as twenty (20) years into the future. (R. 142, ~ 14).
9. On May 3, 1993, QJP filed an application with Summit County to amend
the General Plan to reinstate the commercial use and eliminate the ten or twenty year
delay so that Q.TPcould obtain the rights to an economically viable use and immediate
10. At the time it denied QJP's May 3, 1993 application, Summit County had
in place a land use plan giving land use control over the Q1P Property to Park City
because of interlocal agreements between the City and County and because the QJP
Property was within Park City's annexation declaration zone. Summit County directed
QJP to request all development approvals from Park City pursuant to the interlocal
agreements between Park City and Summit County, which required Park City's approval
for any development of the QJP Property. (R.142, ~~ 13,15,17).
11. QJP then proceeded to exhaust its administrative remedies against Summit
County, eventually commencing litigation against Summit County, which is still
pending, Merrill v. Summit County, Civil No. 950600004. QJP has simultaneously
665 :391935v4 4
pursued its vested rights and constitutional claims through administrative remedies
provided by the City and County.' (R. 142, ~ 16).
12. On September 28, 1993, Summit County and Park City formalized their
pre-existing agreement to allow Park City to exercise de facto control over property
beyond its borders by executing a formal interlocal planning agreement (the "Interlocal
Agreement"), which is still being enforced today? (R. 143, ~ 18; see also Exhibit 5).
13. Under the terms of the Interlocal Agreement, Summit County "authorize]d]
and formalize[ d] Park City's participation in land use planning, development approvals,
and the provision of urban services in unincorporated portions of Summit County and/or
in proximity to the City limits." (Id.)
14. In addition, the Interlocal Agreement provided that any development at
standards and requirements, which are not part of Summit County's land use code. (R.
143, ~ 20).
15. The effect of the September 28, 1993 Interlocal Agreement, as well as
other agreements between Park City and Summit County, was to force QJP to obtain
] QJP believes Summit County should also be a party to this action, however, when the
action was instituted QJP was already engaged with the County in an action before the
Property Rights Ombudsmen. This action was dismissed before the Ombudsmen action
was concluded and Summit County could be made a party.
2 Park City has also exercised control over the northeast side of Quinn's Junction,
consistently reaffirming to QJP and the public at that time that no development would
occur there because of wetland issues, slope, and critical open space view areas, even
though the northeast side of Quinn's Junction was also not within Park City's boundaries.
(R. 145, ~ 29; see also Exhibit 7).
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annexation into Park City and development approval from Park City before it could
obtain any economically viable use for the Q1P Property. (R. 144, ~ 22).
16. The ultimate effect of the Interlocal Agreement and other City/County
agreements was to force QJP to comply with ambiguous, often conflicting, and vague
development criteria of Park City, even though the Q1P Property was not located in Park
City. (R. 144, ~ 23).
17. Even though the Interlocal Agreement expired by its terms, Park City is
still exercising control of the QJP Property by requiring annexation and approval for any
development. (R. 161, ~ 89).
18. Over the next fifteen (15) years, QJP was not allowed to develop its
property either in Summit County or Park City, although, as explained below, it
and Summit County. (R. 144, ~ 26). As part of its efforts, QJP sought and obtained a
hearing in Summit County regarding its claim that it possessed a vested right in certain
development permits on the QJP Property. (R. 145, ~ 28).
19. In the vested rights hearing, Summit County, through its planning
department, agreed to restore the previous commercial use to the QJP Property by
designating the QJP Property 'commercial' in its general land use plan. On March 18,
1996, Park City also recognized the restored commercial zoning of the QJP Property,
665 :391935v4
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designating the property as commercial on its draft land-use maps and General Plan.3
(R. 145, ~ 28; see also Exhibit 6).
20. QJP was still not contiguous to Park City, however, so it could not apply
for annexation at that time. (R. 145, ~ 27).
21. In about March 1996, Summit County, which had agreed to restore a
commercial use to the QJP Property by virtue of the vested rights hearing on August 29,
1995, refused to do so. (R. 147, ~ 37).
22. On March 20, 1997, Park City altered its General Plan, designating the QJP
Property as only a "possible commercial receiving zone" instead of a commercial zone.
(R. 145, ~~ 30-31; see also Exhibit 8.)
3 The 1995 Park City General Plan shows the QJP Property as the only possible
commercial use at Quinn's Junction. (R. 146, ~ 32; see also Exhibit 9). The 1995 Park
City General Plan contains the following language relative to the Southwest comer of
Quinn's Junction which includes the thirty (30) acre QJP parcel:
It is expected that property owners will be able to achieve
reasonable development potential from their land while
meeting ... community objectives. (R. 146, ~ 34; Exhibit 10,
p.31).
The 70-acre parcel [including the QJP 30-acres] is unique in
character because of its highway access, visibility, relatively
gentle topography, vegetation (agricultural use), relationship
to other recreational attractions (specifically Jordanelle
Reservoir), and relationship to the Silver Creek corridor. All
of these features demand special focus. (R. 146, ~ 34;
Exhibit 11, p. 43).
[G]uidelines [should be established] for a mixed use,
clustered, commercial development on the Southwest comer
parcel. (R. 146, ~ 34; Exhibit 12, p. 44).
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23. The 1997 Park City General Plan, described above, contains the following
language on page 38:
Maintain an open space corridor from the ridge tops along
highway 40 to highway 248. Using the ridge tops as a
boundary, maintain the same open space corridor along the
North side of the Highway 248 to the Treasure Mountain
Middle school. (R. 146, ~ 35; Exhibit 13).
24. During QJP's discussions with Summit County at this time, it was made
clear to QJP that Park City's approval was necessary before any development could
occur. (R. 147, ~ 38).
25. Despite the passage of both the County and City General Plans suggesting
a possible commercial use for the QJP Property, both Park City and Summit County
continued to obstruct QJP's efforts to obtain any development approval for the QJP
26. In furtherance of this strategy of obstruction, Park City and Summit County
informed Q1P that as a pre-condition to any development application or formal
annexation petition, QJP would be required to organize all property owners in the Park
City annexation declaration zone, and prepare a master plan and annexation petition for
the area. (R. 148, ~ 41).
27. From 1998 through May 3, 1999, QIP attempted to organize and formulate
a master plan with the property owners at Quinn's Junction as required by Park City. (R.
148, ,-r 42; see also Exhibit 15).
28. Park City, however, continuously undermined QJP's attempts to organize
property owners in annexation declaration zone by purchasing large tracts of property
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from the very property owners QJP was directed to organize at Quinn's Junction. (R.
149, ~ 47; see also Exhibit 17).
29. Prior to May 3, 1999, while QJP was attempting to organize property
owners, QJP was advised by Park City that it would not annex or approve any
development on the QJP Property until after the 2002 Utah Winter Olympics. (R. 148, ~
43).
30. Together with Summit County, Park City pursued a strategy of land use
regulation which was intended to bankrupt QJP and other property owners or force QJP
and others to sell their property to Park City as open space at a fraction of those
properties' value by assuring they would never be annexed or allowed any economically
viable use. (R. 148, ~ 44).
'U
oJ ~ •
Park City on May 3, 1999 sent QJP its first inquiry regarding purchasing the QJP
Property, by letter from Sally Elliot (Summit County Commissioner from 2005 to
present) through a Park City citizen group known as "COSAC." (R. 149, ~ 46; see also
Exhibit 16).
32. After the 2002 Utah Winter Olympics, QJP again approached Park City
and Summit County about annexing and obtaining approval to develop the QJP Property.
QJP was informed, however, that the City and the County had commenced a new land
use study of Quinn's Junction and that no development would be accepted or approved
until the completion of the Study. (R. 149, ~ 48). By letter to Park City, Summit County
"made clear that both the County and City are legally prohibited from considering
665 :391935v4 9
development proposals in the study-area until the study is complete." (R. 150, ~ 49; see
also Exhibit 18 (emphasis added)).
33. This prohibition on development was, in fact, an illegal moratorium
prohibited under Utah law, including Utah Code Annotated I0-9a-504, 4 imposing on
QJP a temporary zoning ordinance (TZRO) without procedural due process.
34. As part of their land-use study, Park City and Summit County hired Steve
Coyle, an outside land use expert from Oregon, to review its land use regulations. On
September 11, 2003, the consultant sent a draft report to Park City and to Summit
County. (R. 151, ~ 53; see also Exhibit 20).
35. Mr. Coyle's draft report found that Park City and Summit County land use
regulations were vague, ambiguous, inequitable, and entirely subjective in their
approvals. (R. 150, ~ 52; see also Exhibit 19).
36. Mr. Coyle's report found the land use code was a discretionary code that in
practice:
• "[P]roduce[ d] a high level of uncertainty about the
successful outcome of a proposed development plan
[due to the lack of] specific, measurable criteria for
achieving an approval."
• "[P]lace[ d] virtually all of the responsibility on
property owners ... to meet the code's discretionary
criteria, [and provided] no clear plan approval
pathway."
4 Under Utah law a temporary land use regulation could not be longer than 6 months.
D.C.A. § 10-9a-504 (2).
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• Rendered "appropriate design . . . secondary to a
process that relies on a subjective evaluation by the
agency reviewers."
(R. 151, ~ 54; see also Exhibit 19, p. 2).
37. Mr. Coyle's report found that Park City's and Summit County's
discretionary land use policies had the effect of "1) creating a low density development
on individual parcels that are neither resource efficient nor coherently planned in the
larger context; 2) selling land as open space preserves, and; 3) litigation." (R. 151, ~ 55;
see also Exhibit 19, p. 2).
38. Mr. Coyle's report also found that "while the purchase of land in the area
as open space may be a stated goal of both City and County officials, intentionally or
unintentionally relying on a discretionary code system to effectively reduce property
Exhibit 19, p. 2).
39. Mr. Coyle's report also criticized the political nature of the "discretionary
zoning" system, which "vests substantial political control over the planning process
[and] can provide leverage for the promotion of pro-growth, no-growth or other land use
agendas by restricting or facilitating the location, quality, and quantity of development
that is not tied to a specific plan." (R. 151-152, ~ 57; see also Exhibit 19, p. 2).
40. Moreover, Mr. Coyle's report found that the political nature of the
discretionary zoning system makes it difficult to achieve a "specific plan," or Master
Plan for an area, because it "works against public support, [and inequitably creates]
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higher-zoned economic winners and base-zone losers as a result of the planning process,
a further deterrent to broad support." (R. 151-152, ~ 57; see also Exhibit 19, pp. 2-3).
41. Mr. Coyle also found Quinn's lunction to be an appropriate location for
commercial development, including retail, commercial mixed use, industrial and
residential.' (R. 152, ~~ 58-60; see also Exhibit 19, pp. 4-5).
42. Rather than present this draft or submit a final report to the public, or have
Mr. Coyle continue, Park City and Summit County terminated Mr. Coyle, buried the
report from public view, and avoided the use of other outside consultants. (R. 152, ~ 61).
43. Thereafter, Park City and Summit County prepared their own report titled
'Quinn's Junction Study' (Joint Planning Commission Development Principles), which it
thereafter treated as its General Plan (the "Ql Study"). (R. 153; ~ 63; see also Exhibit
44. On October 21, 2004, Park City annexed a portion of its own property on
the north and east side of Quinn's lunction, making the Q1P Property contiguous to the
Park City limits for the first time. (R. 154, ~ 68). Before October 21, 2004, QJP could
not file a petition to annex into Park City because the Q1P Property was not contiguous
to the City boundary. (R. 145, ~ 27).
45. After the October 21, 2004 annexation of the Park City parcel, QJP jointly
petitioned for annexation into Park City with Barnes Bank, the owner of a parcel
adjacent to the QJP Property. (R. 154, ~ 70).
5 There have been at least 3 major studies over the past 10 years which have consistently
found a commercial demand at Quinn's lunction and the Q1P Property as the logical
place for a commercial node. (R. 152, fn. 2).
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46. QJP and Barnes Bank hired the same consultant and prepared a joint
petition showing the same master planned development on the fifty-four (54) contiguous
acres they own adjacent to the City boundary. (R. 154, ~ 71; see also Exhibit 22).
47. For these services, QJP paid in excess of $50,000, which included a non-
refundable filing fee paid to Park City and a planning fee to the consultant. (R. 154,
~ 72).
48. Because of expensive non-refundable filing fees, it has been the informal
policy of Park City and prospective applicants to get preliminary approval from the
agents and employees of the City prior to submission of an annexation petition. (R. 154,
~ 73).
49. In accordance with that practice, QJP met with Park City and was told that
50. On May 14, 2004, Park City had unanimously approved a pnor pre-
annexation agreement with Q1P which would have provided for substantial commercial
development on the QJP Property. (R. 158, ~ 86(f); see also Exhibit 36).
51. During meetings with Park City, however, QJP was advised that it should
not file a joint petition with Barnes Bank because Park City was going to reject the
annexation of the Barnes Bank property and QJP's petition would also be rejected if it
filed a joint petition with Barnes. (R. 154-155, ~ 74).
52. Park City also advised QJP that the reason it annexed only a small
peninsula of its own land on the northeast border of the QJP Property on October 21,
2004 was to avoid annexing the Barnes Bank property. (R. 154-155, ~~ 68, 75).
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53. QJP was further advised that if it filed a separate petition, Park City would
accept the petition and annex the QJP Property into the City. (R. 155, ~ 76).
54. QJP advised Barnes Bank of this fact and the parties agreed to separate
their joint petition and file amended, separate petitions. (R. 155, ~ 77).
55. Barnes Bank, a/k/a Park City Heights, then sent Park City a letter of
protest. (R. 155, ~ 78; see also Exhibit 24).
56. On or about January 24, 2005, QJP and Barnes Bank, a/k/a Park City
Heights filed separate annexation petitions, which contained the same proposed per acre
development and densities. (R. 155, ~ 79; see also Exhibits 25-26).
57. On March 10, 2005, Park City held a brief hearing and considered both
annexation petitions. (R, 155, ~ 80; see also Exl1ibit 27),
58. On March la, 2005, before the annexation hearing, the Park City staff
submitted a positive recommendation regarding annexation of the QJP Property. (R.
156, ~ 83(b); see also Exhibit 30).
59. During the March 10, 2005 hearing, however, Park City unanimously
accepted the Barnes Bank petition and denied the QJP petition by a vote of three to two.
(R. 155, ~~ 80-82).
60. The first reason for the denial stated in the hearing was the potential for
"the creation of [an] island, or, at a minimum, a peninsula" due to certain adjacent land
owned by the Osguthorpe family. (Exhibit 28, p. 7).
61. The alleged island or peninsula, however (the Osguthorpe parcel) arose
because Park City deliberately annexed only a portion of a parcel it owned adjacent to
665 :391935v4
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the QJP Property, and failed to include all contiguous city-owned property within that
annexation as required by State law. (R. 157, ~ 86(a)). Park City's strategic annexation
of its own property artificially created the technical issues of contiguity, peninsulas and
islands.6 (R. 159, ~ 86(k)).
62. In addition, the owner of the Osguthorpe parcel which allegedly created the
peninsula caused a letter to be sent to Park City on March 8, 2005, informing Park City
that he was "now willing to consider inclusion of the trust property in the proposed
annexation" of the QJP Property and Barnes Bank property. (R. 158-159, ~ 86U); see
also Exhibit 29).
63. Another reason stated in the hearing for the rejection of the QJP Petition
was that the "proposed design" was incompatible with the "spirit" of the City's General
Plan (the "QJ Study" referenced above in Paragraph 43). (Exhibit 28, p. 8).
64. The annexation petition submitted by Barnes Bank and approved by Park
City, however, was nearly identical to the annexation petition and development proposed
by QJP, including the same per acre development and densities. (R. 155, 157, ~~ 79,
86(c); see also Exhibits 25-26).
65. There is no legitimate basis for Park City to differentiate the Barnes Bank
property from the QJP Property based on a prior pre-annexation agreement, dated July 2,
6 In addition, the creation of so-called peninsulas through annexation does not generally
prevent Park City annexations. For example, about eight months prior to the denial of
QJP's annexation petition, Park City annexed two separate properties in the Quinn's
Junction area that both created similar peninsulas. (R. 157, ~~ 86(a), (b)). Both
properties are currently undergoing commercial development. (Id.)
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1992, between Park City and Barnes' predecessor because by its terms, the Barnes Bank
property was subject to the same current land use regulations as the Q1P Property and the
Barnes' petition included property owners that did not have pre-annexation agreements.
(R. 158, ~ 86(h)).
66. On March 13, 2005, three days after the annexation hearing, the Mayor of
Park City called Ralph Merrill and again offered to buy the Q1P Property to be used as
open space. Merrill declined. (R. 156, ~ 83(e)).
67. One day later, on March 14, 2005, Park City issued a formal notice of
rejection of QJP's annexation petition, without giving any reason. (R. 156, ~ 83(f); see
also Exhibit 32). The formal notice also contained outright errors, including the
statement that the vote against annexation was 5-0 when in reality it was 3-2. (See
Exhibit 28, pp. 9-10; see also Exhibit 33).
68. On March 19,2005, the Park City Mayor issued the following statement to
the press:
There is land along Park City's S.R. 248 entry-way that could
be purchased with revenues from another bond. At this point
that's the place that's still open and probably faces the greatest
threat from development.
(R. 156, ~ 83(h); see also Exhibit 34).
69. Upon information and belief, the QJP Property is the land on the S.R. 248
entry-way that the mayor referred to in his comments to the press. (R. 156-157, ~ 84).
665 :391935v4
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70. Park City used subjective, vague, ambiguous, and unlawful criteria to
reject Q1P's petition including the Ql Study which the Court should declare void or
illegal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 10-9a-801(3). (R. 159, ~ 86(m)).
71. Park City used land regulation to acquire Q1P's property as open space
without just compensation and due process. (R. 159, ~ 86(n)).
72. Park City did not apply the law equally to Q1P and other similarly situated
properties as required by its own municipal ordinances and the Utah State Constitution.
(R. 159, ~ 86(0)).
73. Even though the Q1P Property is not within Park City's boundaries, Park
City has and is exercising land use control over the Property, and is refusing to allow any
economically viable use of the Property to proceed. (R. 160, ~ 88).
refusal to annex the QJP Property or approve any development thereon, has left QJP with
no economically viable use for the property. (R. 161-162, ~ 94).
75. In addition, Park City has deprived QJP of its reasonable investment-
backed expectations for the QJP Property, based on the commercial land prices and taxes
paid by Q1P, as well as the various fees and other expenses it has incurred as a result of
representations by and requirements of Park City. (R. 162, ~ 95).
76. Park City's refusal to annex the QJP Property or allow any economically
viable use does not substantially advance any legitimate public interest, nor is it
reasonably related or narrowly tailored to any such interest. (R. 162, ~ 96).
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77. QJP has exhausted its administrative remedies, Park City has waived any
such requirement, or it would be futile for QIP to take further action in this regard. (R.
162, ~ 97).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This action is the result of Park City's efforts for the past fifteen (15) years to
preclude development on the QJP Property and to maintain that property as open space
for the benefit of Park City without payment of just compensation. The QJP Property lies
in Summit County, outside the boundaries of Park City. Nonetheless, when QIP
petitioned Summit County to reinstate a commercial zone on the QJP Property in 1993,
after a downzoning from commercial to base density, QIP was informed that it could not
obtain anv development for the OJP Pronertv without annroval and annexation bv Park-'... ........1 eI ..1..1. eI
annexation declaration zone and being covered by interlocal agreements between Summit
County and Park City giving Park City control over the property.
For the last fifteen (15) years, up to and including the present time, Park City has
imposed one obstacle after another to block QJP's efforts to obtain an economically
viable use for the QJP Property. Because the QJP Property was not contiguous to Park
City until October, 2004, QJP spent the years from 1993 through 2004 seeking
development approval from both Summit County and Park City without annexation.
Following a determination of vested rights by Summit County in 1995, and several
changes to Park City's General Plan, in 1998 Summit County designated the QJP
Property as a possible village center. As a precondition to obtaining approval for any
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such development, however, QJP was required to organize the neighboring landowners
and craft a Master Plan, along with obtaining the approval of Park City, for the Quinn's
Junction area. QJP was thwarted in those efforts, however, first by Park City'S strategic
land purchases in the area, and then by Park City'S 1999 decision not to approve any
development before the 2002 Winter Olympics. Park City then made its first inquiry to
QJP regarding purchasing the QJP Property for open space, after having depressed the
price by consistently precluding any development for years before and into the
foreseeable future.
The completion of the Winter Olympics brought only further delay for QJP, as
Park City then blocked all development efforts pending the completion of a three-year
land-use studv at Ouinn's Junction. When the outside exnert retained bv Park Citv and
• "' .1..1 •
intentions, Park City fired the expert, disregarded his findings, and crafted its own report.
During the lengthy study moratorium, the QJP Property became contiguous to
Park City's boundaries for the first time. QIP then dutifully obtained a pre-annexation
agreement from Park City and filed its petition for annexation. Inexplicably, in spite of
the pre-annexation agreement and representations by Park City that the QJP Petition
would be favored, Park City denied QJP's petition. Park City's simultaneous approval of
a nearly identical petition filed by an adjacent landowner revealed that Park City's stated
reasons for the QJP denial, including the creation of a peninsula and incompatibility with
Park City's land-use study, were pretextual and false. After the denial of QJP's
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annexation petition, Park City made another offer to buy the QIP Property as open space
at depressed prices, revealing the true purpose of its annexation decision.
A municipality's decision regarding an annexation petition is generally entitled to
deference from the courts, unless the facts demonstrate that the decision was "arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal," or tainted by an abuse of power or fraud. QIP has clearly made
the factual allegations necessary to establish that Park City's decision is subject to the
Court's review pursuant to the standards set forth by the Utah Appellate Courts. The
facts show that Park City has abused its annexation power and its authority under the
interlocal agreements with Summit County to obstruct any and all efforts by QJP to
obtain an economically viable use for the QJP Property. As set forth in greater detail
below, Park City has imnoscd one delav and obstruction after another for the nurnose of~ -:J "" - -.r - -. - -".I - - - - - - - - ..J. ..I
presents an "unjust" situation demanding judicial review.
Park City denied QIP's annexation petition for the purpose of precluding all
development on the property, and either maintaining the property in its current
undeveloped state or obtaining the property for open space at an artificially depressed
price. The allegations of QJP's Revised Second Amended Complaint, when viewed
under the standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, state a valid claim
that Park City's annexation decision, in the context of Park City's conduct for the past
fifteen (15) years, was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. In addition, the allegations
regarding Park City's actions and intent to preclude any development by abusing its
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annexation power and interlocal agreements with Summit County, if established at trial,
state a valid claim for inverse condemnation of the QJP Property.
ARGUMENT
I. The Deference to be Afforded Park City's Annexation Decision Does
Not Prevent Judicial Review of Park City's Arbitrary, Capricious, and
Illegal Motives, Purposes, and Actions in this Case.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[a] determination of city boundaries is a
legislative function ... [for which] courts are reluctant to interfere." Child v. Spanish
Fork, 538 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah 1975) (citing Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 493 P.2d 643
(Utah 1972». However, the Supreme Court has also unequivocally affirmed the courts'
authority and duty to intervene where "the decisions or actions taken ... are so wholly
unreasonable and unjust that they must be deemed capricious and arbitrary in adversely
§7Al (2007) ("Since the change of municipal boundaries is regarded as a legislative
question ... [the municipality's] decision is final as to the existence of the facts in the
absence of abuse of power or fraud) (emphasis added); Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)
(2007) (court shall determine whether municipality's land use decision is "arbitrary,
capricious, and illegal. ").
In Creekside Associates, Inc. v. City of Wood Dale, 684 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ill.
1988), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois confronted a similar
claim to that of QJP in this case. In Creekside, the plaintiffs could not obtain
development permits for their property without first being annexed into the defendant
city. Id. at 203. Plaintiffs submitted a plan and annexation proposal to the City, which
665 :391935v4 21
was originally accepted by the Planning Commission before being summarily rejected by
the City Council. Id. Plaintiffs "alleged that Wood Dale's refusal to annex and
appropriately zone the property" was arbitrary and capricious because it "bore no
relationship to public policy and served no legitimate public interest." Id. at 205. The
defendant city moved to dismiss, but the court ruled that:
While plaintiffs' burden of proving the absence of any legitimate
justification for Wood Dale's decision may be difficult, we cannot conclude
on the face of the complaint that a trier of fact could not find that Wood
Dale's failure to annex and zone the parcel for development in compliance
with the Wood Dale plan was arbitrary and capricious. On this basis alone,
Plaintiffs have stated a cognizable claim.
Id.
The facts are more compelling in this case. QIP entered into a pre-annexation
agreement with Park City on May 14, 2004, and the Park City Council on March 10,
2005 arbitrarily and capriciously reneged on that agreement and rejected QIP's
annexation petition. Moreover, as explained in more detail below, Park City rejected
QIP's annexation petition as just one action in an ongoing course of conduct carried out
for the pre-determined purpose of precluding all development and either obtaining the
QIP Property for open-space at an artificially depressed price, or maintaining the QJP
Property in its current, undeveloped state. The pre-determined reasons for Park City's
conduct, including the denial of the annexation petition, as alleged by QIP and accepted
as true for purposes of this appeal, serve no legitimate public interest.
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II. Park City Is and Has Been Abusing its Annexation Power to Obtain
Open Space Without Paying Just Compensation by Preventing All
Development and Either Maintaining the Property in its Undeveloped
State or Obtaining the Property at an Artificially Depressed Price.
Q1P has made diligent efforts since the early 1990's to obtain approval for an
economically viable use of the Q1P Property. Park City and Summit County, however,
have imposed one obstacle and delay after another to thwart those efforts. When Q1P
purchased the thirty (30) acres comprising the Q1P Property at commercial prices in
1990, it was the only property designated as a hard zone commercial node in the area.
(R. 141, ~ 8). In 1993, the QJP Property was down-zoned to one (1) unit per forty (40)
acres. (R. 142, ~ 14). In response to the down-zoning, QJP filed an application with
Summit County to reinstate the commercial zone. (R. 142, ~ 15). The application was
denied, and Summit County directed QJP to seek all future development approvals from
Park City, because interlocal agreements between Park City and Summit County gave
Park City control over development decisions on the Q1P Property. (R. 142, ~ 15).
In 1995, Summit County heard QJP's claim that it possessed a vested right in
certain development permits on the QJP Property. (R. 145, ~ 28). In the vested rights
hearing, Summit County, through its planning department, agreed to restore the previous
commercial use to the Q1P Property, by designating the Q1P Property 'commercial' in its
general land use plan. On March 18, 1996, Park City also recognized the restored
commercial zoning of the QJP Property, designating the property as commercial on its
draft land-use maps and General Plan. In or about March 1996, however, Summit
County refused to restore the commercial zone. (R. 147, ~ 37). On March 20, 1997,
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Park City also adopted a new General Plan designating the QJP Property as only a
"possible commercial receiving zone." (R. 145, ~~ 30-31; see also Exhibit 8).
QJP continued to seek a reinstatement of the commercial zone, and In 1998,
Summit County placed a possible village center zone on the QJP Property. (R. 147, ~
39). As a precondition to any development application, however, Park City and Summit
County directed QJP to organize all property owners within the Park City annexation
declaration zone to prepare a master plan and annexation petition. (R. 148, ~ 41). QJP
accordingly worked diligently to do so from 1998 through May 1999, while Park City
simultaneously sought to undermine those efforts through strategic land purchases from
landowners that QJP had been directed to organize. (R. 149, ~ 47). In or about May,
1999, Ralph Merrill was advised that Park City would not annex or approve any
rlp"plnntTIPnt i rrrtil ~ftpr thp ?OO? \Vintpr ()hTrrlnit"'c (R lLlSl ~~ Li?_Ll1\ Th"c ;n 1\,1"",-- • -'.&'-'1"" .•..•.&_.....•.•.._ ..•..•.•...•.•.-~ •.._.... •...•...•.- ~v V~ .•. , .•..1..1.• ._.... '-'.I..J ..•..& .•. y.l.'"'u. \..&."....... u, II II I •••• ·• -' Jo ...•. .I..I.L&oJ, .I..•...• .11'.1.")
1999, having precluded development of the QJP Property for six years and having
announced their intention to continue to delay any development for at least three more,
Park City, through its citizen group COSAC, sent QJP a letter inquiring about a possible
sale of the QJP Property to Park City as open space. (R. 149, ~ 46). QJP declined the
offer.
After the 2002 Winter Olympics, QJP approached Park City and Summit County
again about annexing and developing the QJP Property, as both the City's and County's
land use maps indicated at least a possible commercial zone for the property. (R. 149,
~ 48). In response, Park City informed QJP that no development would take place until
the completion of another land use study for Quinn's Junction. (Id.) This study took
665 :391935v4
24
three (3) years to complete, in part because the first consultant hired by Park City and
Summit County, Steve Coyle, made several determinations that were adverse to Park
City's and Summit County's interests. (R. ISO, 152,~,-r 50,58).
Mr. Coyle concluded that: (a) Quinn's Junction was an acceptable location for
commercial development, and (b) Park City's and Summit County's opaque and
discretionary land-use regulations, either intentionally or unintentionally, enabled Park
City to inequitably acquire property for open space at artificially depressed prices. (R.
151, ,-r 56; see also Exhibit 19, p. 2). Mr. Coyle stated as follows in his report:
While the purchase of land in the area as open space may be a stated goal of
both City and County officials, intentionally or unintentionally relying on a
discretionary code system to effectively reduce property values may result
in a less equitable means to achieve this end.
(Id.) Following the issuance of this critical report, Mr. Coyle was promptly fired and
the report buried. (R. 152, ,-r61).
Park City and Summit County then prepared their own report, contradicting that of
the independent expert, Mr. Coyle. (R. 153, ,-r 63). As the study dragged on, a property
owner adjacent to the QJP Property declared bankruptcy due to the deadlock. (R. 150,
,-r 50). Park City purchased that property and has maintained it as open space to this day.
In October 2004, Park City annexed a portion of the adjacent property, making the
QJP Property contiguous to Park City, and thus potentially annexable, for the first time.
(R. 154, ,-r 68). Accordingly, with the previously insurmountable obstacle to development
lifted, QJP and another adjacent property owner, Barnes Bank, filed a joint petition for
annexation into Park City. (R. 154, ,-r 70). During a subsequent meeting with Park City,
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however, QJP was advised to file its own separate annexation petition because QJP's
petition was favored by Park City while Barnes Bank's petition was not. (R. 154-155,
~ 74). Accordingly, QJP and Barnes Bank separated their petitions, but maintained the
same joint commercial master plan including the same per acre development and
densities. (R. 155, ~ 79).
At the annexation hearing on March 10, 2005, contrary to its prior statements,
Park City unanimously accepted Barnes Bank's petition and denied QJP's petition by a
vote of three to two. (R. 155, ~~ 81-82). One day after issuing the formal denial ofQJP's
petition and once again precluding development for the foreseeable future, Park City
again offered to purchase the QJP Property for open space at depressed prices. (R. 156,
~ 83(e)). QJP again declined. The following day, the mayor of Park City issued a press
should be purchased with open space funds because it "face[ d] the greatest threat from
development." (R. 156, ~ 83(h); see also Exhibit 34).
According to these facts, Park City is exercising regulatory control over the QJP
Property pursuant to its interJocal agreements with Summit County, and is exercising that
control to preclude any economicaJIy viable use of the QJP Property. "A reviewing court
may not inquire into the motives of municipal authorities or others with respect to
annexation or detachment of municipal areas, unless the proceedings are tainted by
malice, fraud, corruption, or gross abuse of discretion." McQuillan Mun. Corp. §7.41
(2007) (emphasis added). The facts in this case establish that Park City has grossly
abused its discretion in refusing to annex or approve any use of the QJP Property for the
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purpose of precluding any development and obtaining the property as open space either
without payment of just compensation or at an extortionate price. It is difficult to
imagine a more tainted proceeding.
The trial court erred, and disregarded the facts, when it ruled that "[a]t best,
plaintiff has claimed a pattern of conduct that does not allow land owners to fully utilize
their land." (R. 238). That characterization ignores the IS-year history of Park City's
abuses, including repeated moratoria, false statements, and the culminating denial of the
annexation petition, all of which have not just precluded QJP from "fully utiliz[ing]" its
property but have precluded any use at all. The actions of Park City, as alleged, are "so
wholly discordant to reason and justice that [they] must be deemed capricious and
arbitrary and thus in violation of complainant's rights." Triangle Oil v. North Salt Lake
conduct should not have been dismissed and the trial court's decision must be reversed.
III. Park City's Improper and Abusive Exercise Of Its Regulatory and
Annexation Powers Resulted In An Inverse Condemnation of the QJP
Property.
In its Revised Second Amended Complaint and Petition, QJP has properly asserted
a claim for inverse condemnation. Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that
"[p ]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation." "This provision is broader in its language than the similar provision in
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904
P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995). An inverse condemnation action requires "(1) property,
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(2) a taking or damages, and (3) a public use." Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v.
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah 1990). Accordingly:
[t]he takings analysis has two principal steps: First, the claimant must
demonstrate some 'protectible interest in property.' If the claimant
possesses a protectible property interest, the claimant must then show that
the interest has been 'taken or damaged' by government action. A 'taking'
is 'any substantial interference with private property which destroys or
materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed.'
Strawberry Elec. Servo Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996)
(citations omitted).
A. QJP Has A Protectible Property Interest.
The trial court improperly ruled that "simply because plaintiff may have certain
expectations about its property does not equate to a vested property interest affected by
however, are simply the expectations commensurate with fee simple ownership of any
real property - the expectation that the fee simple owner be allowed to put the property to
some economically viable use. The facts demonstrate that Park City has not merely
precluded QJP from "fully utilize[ing] their land," as found by the trial court, it has
effectively deprived QJP of any economically viable use through the abuse of its
annexation power and interlocal agreements. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (payment of just compensation required where restriction
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of the land); Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (regulation that causes
diminution in value or interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations may
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constitute a taking requiring payment of just compensation); Arnell v. Salt Lake County
Bd. of Adjustment, 2005 UT App 165, ~ 17, 112 P.3d 1214 (analyzing takings claim
through extent of regulatory restriction and interference with investment-backed
expectations). Because annexation and Park City approval is a required precondition to
any development on the QJP Property, Q1P's expectations with respect to annexation are
reasonable and protectible. Accordingly, Q1P has established, for purposes of the motion
to dismiss, that it has a protectible property interest for purpose of its inverse
condemnation claim.
Moreover, Q1P has a recognized property interest in the commercial rights in the
QPl property, as set forth in its Revised Second Amended Complaint as follows:
The County, through its planning department, agreed to restore the previous
commercial use to the QJP Property by designating the Q1P Property
recognized the restored commercial zoning of the QJP Property,
designating the property as commercial on its maps. Those actions were
taken, in part, because, in a hearing on August 29, 1995, the Summit
County Commission found QJP had vested commercial rights in the QJP
Property and directed the County Planning Commission to restore a
commercial hard zone to the QJP Property.
(R. 145, ~ 128; see also Exhibit 6).
B. Park City's Refusal to Permit Development and to Annex the
QJP Property Can and Does Constitute A Regulatory Taking or
Inverse Condemnation.
The trial court erred when it found that "Park City's Council decision placed no []
restriction on plaintiffs use of his property." (R. 242). As alleged by Q1P, Park City's
acts, pursuant to its interlocal agreements with Summit County, not only restrict but
preclude Q1P's use of its property for any economically viable purpose.
665 :391935v4 29
Regulatory takings "occur when a governmental entity intrudes to limit the use of
private property while not physically seizing it." B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt
Lake County, 2005 UT 89, ~ 33, 541 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. "[Z]oning regulations are a
typical form of regulatory taking." Id.
The Supreme Court has assigned no set formula to determine whether a
regulatory taking is unconstitutional. Although there is no set formula, the
Court has 'examined the taking question by engaging in essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries that have identified several factors - such as economic
impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the government action.' Each regulatory
taking stands on its own and must be examined individually to determine
whether it 'substantially advances legitimate state interests' and 'does not
deny an owner economically viable use of his land.'
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). "A regulatory taking transpires when some
significant restriction is placed upon an owner's use of his property for which 'justice and
LLC, 2005 UT 91, ~ 31,127 P.3d 697 (citations omitted).
The analysis set forth in the Creekside case is again relevant and persuasive, and
contradicts the trial court's ruling that a decision not to annex property cannot restrict the
use of that property. Creekside Associates, Inc., 684 F. Supp. at 201. In Creekside, the
U.S. District Court concluded that "plaintiffs have also stated a cognizable claim by
alleging that the City Council's decision [not to annex] deprived them of all use of their
property without compensation." Id. at 205. "A municipality cannot without
compensation deprive a property owner of all reasonable uses of the property even if such
deprivation serves a legitimate public interest." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the refusal
to annex and approve the development plan can serve as the underlying act supporting a
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takings claim. "By alleging that the City Council's decision rendered their property
worthless, plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief may be granted and thereby
survived [the] motion to dismiss." Id.
This is precisely what QJP has alleged here - that in refusing to approve
development and annex the QJP Property, when annexation and approval by Park City
are requirements for development, Park City has deprived Q1P of any economically
viable use for the property. Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1025 (2002); Amell, 2005 UT App 165 at
~ 17. In addition, Park City has deprived Q1P of its reasonable investment-backed
expectations for the QJP Property, based on the commercial land prices and taxes paid by
QJP, as well as the various fees and other expenses it has incurred as a result of
representations by Park City officials. (R. 162, ~ 95). Penn Central Transportation Co.,
open-space is a legitimate public interest, that interest cannot be legally pursued through
deliberate actions depriving Q1P of all economically feasible uses for its property without
payment of just compensation.
Summit County has ceded to Park City the decision making authority over
development of the Q1P Property. Park City has, in tum, abusively exercised its
regulatory and annexation power in a manner designed to preclude all economically
viable uses for the QJP Property. Park City has done so because it desires to maintain the
QJP Property as open space, either without payment of any just compensation or by
payment of a price severely depressed by the fact that it will never allow the property to
665 :391935v4 31

be developed. The facts as alleged set forth a valid claim that Park City's actions
constitute a regulatory taking or inverse condemnation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's order
dismissing this case.
DATED this zo" day of October, 2008.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Scott M. Lilja
Chandler P. Thompson
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Ralph Merrill d/b/a
Quinn's Junction Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) true and correct copies of the within and
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to be hand-delivered, this zo" day of October,
2008, to the following:
Mark D. Harrington
Polly Samuels McLean
Park City Attorney
445 Marsac Avenue
Park City, UT 84060
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§ 10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted -- Time for
filing -- Tolling of time -- Standards governing court review -- Record on review -- Staying of
decision
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision made under
this chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that person
has exhausted the person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority
and Variances, if applicable.
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in
violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with
the district court within 30 days after the local land use decision is final.
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a property
owner files a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with the property rights
ombudsman under Section 13-43-204 until 30 days after:
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or
(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a written statement under Subsection 13-
43-204(3)(b) declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator.
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific constitutional
taking issue that is the subject of the request for arbitration filed with the property rights
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ombudsman by a property owner.
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman after the time
under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has expired does not affect the time to file a
petition.
(3) (a) The courts shall:
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this
chapter is valid; and
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion is
valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or regulation promotes the
purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal.
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is
supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, ordinance, or
regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made or
the ordinance or regulation adopted.
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the municipality takes
final action on a land use application for any adversely affected third party, if the municipality
conformed with the notice provisions of Part 2, Notice, or for any person who had actual
notice of the pending decision.
(5) If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge to the enactment of
a land use ordinance or general plan may not be filed with the district court more than 30
days after the enactment.
(6) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's decision
is final.
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the
reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders, and, if
available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings.
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true and
correct transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7).
(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record provided by
the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be.
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the land use
authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the
land use authority or appeal authority, respectively, and the court determines that it was
improperly excluded.
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence.
(9) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the land use authority or authority
appeal authority, as the case may be.
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(b) (i) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of
a constitutional taking issue under Section 13-43-204, the aggrieved party may petition the
appeal authority to stay its decision.
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authority may order its decision stayed
pending district court review if the appeal authority finds it to be in the best interest of the
municipality.
(iii) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of
a constitutional taking issue is filed under Section 13-43-204, the petitioner may seek an
injunction staying the appeal authority's decision.
Service: Get by LEXST AT®
TOC: Wtah Co£L~~l)ngJC3Jed,Constitution. Court Rules & ALS, Combined> L-,1 > EART 8. DISTRICT COURT
REVIEW> § 10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted - Time for
filing - Tolling of time •• Standards governing court review·· Record on review -- Staying of decision
Citation: UCA 10-9a-801
View: Custom
Segments: Text
DatefTime: Monday, October 20,2008 - 3:01 PM EDT
Search I Research Tasks I Get a Document I Shepard'S® I Alerts I Total Litigator I Transactional Advisor I
Counsel Selector
History I Delivery Manager i Dossier i Switch Client I Preferences I Sign Out i Help
https://www.lexis.comJresearch/retrieve?_ m=4a77 4a5067e88c8d5f906e 1f2c84a317 &_fm... 10/20/2008

ADDENDUM 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Defendant.
RULING and ORDERRALPH MERRILL dba QUINN'SJUNCTION PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiff, Case No. 050500205
v. Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
PARK CITY, DATE: April 22, 2008
The above matter came before the court for oral argument on
April 18, 2008 on defendant's motion to dismiss.
The motion was filed February 15, 2008. Plaintiff opposed the
motion March 6, 2008, and defendant replied in support March 13,
2008. Defendant filed a request to submit on March ~3, 2008. Based
thereon oral argument was scheduled but postponed at the iequest of
the parties.
Plaintiff was present through Scott Lilja and defendant was'
present through "Mark "~arrington.
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since
taking the issues under advisement, the court has further
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. Now being
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fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order.
DISCUSSION
"A rule 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged
in the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief
based on those facts." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hasp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). On a motion to dismiss the court
accepts the material allegations in the complaint as true and
interprets those facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Ath. Comm'n, 2007 UT 99, ~8. Granting a
motion to dismiss "denies the nonmoving party of the right to
litigate his claim on the merits, [and] the threshold for
surviving such a motion is relatively low. fl~derson Dev. Co. v.
Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ~49. "Only if it is clear that the claimant
is not entitled to ielief under ?ny state of facts that could be
pr6ven' {o support the claim shbuld a motion to dismiss be
,.,granted.," Btickne x V" Kennard, 2004 UT.,78" <.[9.
Plaintiff sets forth many allegations in the revised' "second
amended petition for review; complaint for declaratory relief and
damages and jury demand" in which it asks the court to review the
Park City Denial of QJP Annexation Petition and makes claims for
declaratory judgment, inverse condemnation and damages.
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A. PETITION FOR REVIEW.
Plaintiff claims that the Council's land use decision, voted
on March 10, 2005 and recorded in writing March 14, 2005, in a
letter from Park City's Mayor, to reject plaintiff's annexation
petition for Quinn's Junction Parcel (QJP), was arbitrary,
capricious and illegal under UCA 10-9a-801(3). Defendants claim
plaintiff has no cause of action under this statute, that the
CouDcil's decision is not a land use decision, nor a taking nor
did it amount to inverse condemnation.
Plaintiff recites a litany of allegations, many of which
concern decisions, agreements, and other matters that are not
before the court in relation to plaintiff's petition for review,
to show the history of defendant's arbitrary actions. The court
focuses on those allegations pertinent to plaintiff's petition
·for review, which alleges the Park City Council's (the Council)
decision was arbitrary and capricious.
It is well established: .:
[A] determination of city boundaries lS a legislative.
f unct Lon". .·as in all 'legislative matters, :courts
are.reluctant. to interfere therewi th r and do.89 only
when the decisions or actions taken are clearly outside
the authority of the governing body, or are so wholly
unreasonable and unjust that they must be deemed
capricious and arbitrary in adversely affecting
someone's rights.
Child v. Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah 1975) (citing
Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 138 (Utah 1972)). The
Utah Municipal Code states the powers delegated to a municipality
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by statute "shall be liberally construed to permit the
municipality to exercise the powers granted by this act except in
cases clearly contrary to the intent of the law.u DCA 10-1-103) .
1. The Council's Decision was a Land Use Decision.
Defendant claims the Council's decision was not a land use
decision and therefore that plaintiff has no case of action under
UCA 10-9a-801(3). The basic position of defendant is that the
decision by a municipality to NOT annex is not reviewable in
court. Defendant cites Chevron U.S.A. v. North Salt Lake, 711
P.2d 228 (Utah 1985) to support this claim. However, in the
citation they point to from this case, the Court acknowledges
that the former annexation statute "contemplates that residents
of an annexed area may challenge the annexation in court although
the ac~ does not specify a particular kind of judicial procedure
for such a challenge.u (at 231). This does not mean, as
. .
defen~ants urge, ·thata City :Counhil's annexation ·decision is not·
a land use decision. Bradshaw v Beaver City, 2493 P.2d 643 (Ur..
197.2)" seems to Lnd ica t.e that the decision to annex, is a
legislative function and the courts may review such decision, but
with great reluctance to intrude into the prerogative of that
legislative branch and the courts will interfere if the decision
is so lacking in propriety and reason that it must be deemed
capricious and arbitrary. Further, under MLUDMA, "any person
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adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or
in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a
petition for review of the decision with the district court
within 30 days after the local land use decision is final." UCA
10-9a-801 (2)(a)). The Council's decision to reject an annexation
petition was made, in this court's view, in the exercise of the
provisions of The "Municipal Land Use, Development, and
Management Act" (MLUDMA).
The decision to NOT annex seems to be reviewable in court
under the legislative review provision, UCA 10-9a-801(3) (b). The
court looks at a legislative land use decision to see if it is
reasonably debatable. The court does not substitute its judgment
for that of the legislative body. If the decision could promote
the general welfare or even if it is reasonable debatable that it
is in the interest of the general welfare, the decision is to be
upheld.
"2. The Court Must Presume the Decision is.Valid.
In Utah, "annexation is'a statutory procedure '. .Acity
satisfies the statutory requirements through 'substantial
compliance' with the statute. . the city [has] .broad
discretion when making decisions which it concludes best fulfills
its responsibility for determining municipal boundaries.
Szatkowski v. Bountiful City, 906 P.2d 902, 904 (UT App
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1995) (discussing a prior version of an annexation
statute) (citations omitted). In reviewing a petition for
rehearing, the court "shall presume that a decision, ordinance,
or regulation made under the authority of this chapter is valid;
and . . determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance,
or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." (Id. at 10-
9a-801 (3) ). The statute sets out certain factors to guide a
court's decision. (See Id. at (3)(b)- (d)).
The court cannot conclude, even when presuming all of
plaintiff's allegations to be true, that plaintiff could prevail
in its assertion that the Council's March 2005 decision was
illegal, capricious or arbitrary. At best, plaintiff has claimed
a pattern of conduct that does not allow land owners to fully
util~ze their land. However, this does not equate to an'illegal
or arbitrary decision, and the court cannot see from the
allegations and supporting evidence before it, how this decision
could be viewed as such, as being not even reaso~abiy deb~tabie
"t hat it is in the general welfare. This is particularly .so qLveri
'.' ~ '.
the considerable deference owed to the Coun~il~s decision ~nd the
broad discretion the Council had to grant or deny plaintiff's
petition. DCA 10-2-405(1) (a)(i)(A).
Plaintiff does not allege that the Council failed to adhere
to statutory procedures In denying the petition, nor does
plaintiff substantiate its claims that the Council's decision was
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vague or ambiguous.
Plaintiff's complaint fails to demonstrate that the
Council's action was "outside of its authority or is so wholly
discordant to reason and justice that its action must be deemed
capricious and arbitrary and thus in violation of the
complainant's rights." Triangle Oil v. North Salt Lake Corp., 609
P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1980).
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, with prejudice, as to
the first cause of action. The court has jurisdiction to
entertain the petition but it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
B. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND DAMAGES
Plaintiff asks that the,court grant declaratory judgment
stat :Lng,'"defendant has t aken or damaged by inverse condemnation
. . .
the, QJP property .w,it.hout just compensation" and ~.~,.h~tthe court
award pLa i.rrt i f f f'9,irmarket·value' for the QJP property. Defendant
argues plaintiff does not have a property interest in the denial
of an annexation petition to sustain a claim for inverse
condemnation and the Council's decision had no affect on any such
interest as plaintiff still owns the exact land it did prior to
the Council's decision. Plaintiff responds that its protectible
-7-

property interest was in the use and development of its property.
The court's power to issue declaratory judgment is broad.
DCA 78B-6-401. A plaintiff must first establish four threshold
elements: ~ (1) a justiciable controversy, (2) parties whose
interests are adverse, (3) a legally protectible interest
residing with the party seeking relief, and (4) issues ripe for
judicial determination." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 DT 12,
~15) (citations omitted). However, just as the court has broad
discretion to hear claims for declaratory relief, so too may it
deny declaratory relief when it would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy. DCA 78B-6-404. The Declaratory
Judgment Act, ~'should be liberally construed, (but] the courts
must, nevertheless; operate within the constitutional and
statutory powers and duties imposed upon them. The courts are not
a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory
opinions'.'" Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v.
State, 94'P·.3d 217,' 224 ,(UT. 20·04')(citations orru.t t ed l..
D~fendants cite, a North,Dakota case to support the idea that
,"[d]eclaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate if a
municipality fails to comply with the statutory procedures for
annexation and zoning, but may not be used to test the wisdom of
an annexation or zoning decision." Braunagel v. City of Devils
Lake, 2001 ND 118, ~12. However, the court may interfere with
legislative decisions that are so unguided by wisdom as to be is
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capricious or arbitrary. Child, 538 P.2d 186.
In an inverse condemnation action, if "private property is
taken or damaged for public use without a formal exercise of the
eminent domain power, the property owner may bring an inverse
condemnation action under article I, section 22 to recover the
value of the property. If Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v.
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1990). Despite
dismissing plaintiff's petition for review of the denial of its
annexation petition, the court can consider plaintiff's inverse
condemnation claim under that provision of Utah's Constitution
because it is self-executing. See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.,
795 P.2d 622, 630-35 (Utah 1990). To sustain a claim for damages
in an inverse condemnation action, plaintiff must establish "(1)
property; (2) a taking or damages j and (3)a public use. 1/.
Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, .803 P.2d 1241,
12"44 (Utah 1990).
DeSpite sev~rai couttvolumes of e~hibits·and IGO .
a.lLeqet i.oris .in its .,.complaint,pl.ai nt iff ' s comp lai.nt ~ail9'to
allege a basis for the cou~t to cohclud~ the Council'sacti9n'
could support a claim for inverse condemnation. Simply because
plaintiff may have certain expectations about its property does
not equate to a vested property interest affected by the
Council's annexation decision. Plaintiff cites a California case
to support an expansive view of property interests, despite the
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states' dramatically different approaches to property rights.
Plaintiff fails to establish why the court should eguate
plaintiff's fee simple interest in property with a vested
interest in developing the property for maximum commercial gain,
or at least pursuant to its commercial plan of use. Nor does the
court see how its allegations of vested commercial rights as
determined by the Summit County Commission affect the Park City
Council's boundary determination, nor how that affects the
court's determination of the issues in this case.
As to the takings arm of the analysis, plaintiff's
allegations do not support a regulatory takings claim. Park
City's City Council made the determination NOT to annex
plaintiff's property into the Park City boundaries. Plaintiff's
land is in Summit County. "'A regulatory taking transpires when
some significant restriction is placed upon an owner's use of his
property for which 'justice and fairness' requi re that
compensation be g1ven ."/I Vie~ Condo: owners Ass' n v . MSICO,'
t.L.C., ~005Ur 91, ~31 (intern~l c~tation omitt~d) " Park City's. '. . . . . ." .' . .
Council placed no such restriction on plaintiff's us~ of ·his
property, Nor does their denial of his annexation petition or the
other allegations in plaintiff's complaint cause the court to
believe justice or fairness would ever reguire it to award
plaintiff damages based on the Council's 2005 decision,
Plaintiff's complaint does not establish a basis for the court to
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award declaratory judgment or damages. Plaintiff's rights in the
land are no different before or after the Park City decision.
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, with prejudice, as to
its second cause of action.
Defendant's motion is hereby GRANTED.
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no
further order is required.
DATED this --day of April, 2008.
. ,".
/
/
I
•.....;.~./ .- ," .-.'"
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